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In this paper, we propose that it is possible to combine conventional Human Factors 
approaches to task analysis and crew models to the study of covert networks.  The 
intention is to add to the debate and methods that surround the study of covert 
networks.  We suggest that it is possible to use Human Factors methods to both 
inform Social Network Analysis approaches, and to provide representations by which 
intelligence can be shared and explored. The paper is couched in terms of the WESTT 
approach, which assumes that any given organisation requires social, task and 
knowledge descriptions in order to submit to analysis. 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to the current debate on how covert networks can be studied.  It 
will be argued that much of the current work concentrates of social network analysis, 
and that, while the SNA approach is very useful in the analysis of such networks, it 
can also focus analysis on specific features at the expense of others. The paper does 
not argue for a rejection of the SNA approach, but rather proposes that, in order to 
make sense of network structures, an approach that overlays three forms of 
representation is necessary. In this sense, the approach is similar to that advocated by 
Carley and her colleagues at the 2003 ICCRTS conference.  However, a key 
difference lies in the manner in which we arrive at our network definitions and the 
way in which we represent links across networks. 
 
Following the logic of the WESTT software tool (as presented at the 10th ICCRTS 
conference by Houghton et al., 2005), we assume that any organisation can be 
considered in terms of a set of three interconnected network descriptions, i.e., social, 
task and knowledge.  We further propose that the point of interest lies in the 




Figure one: WESTT triangle 
 
Of particular interest to this paper is the manner in which the different networks in 
figure 1 can be described through a variety of operations, and the manner in which 
these interconnections can be used to hypothesise different social networks.  An initial 
attempt to consider these relations was reported by McMaster et al. (2005) through 
analysis that manipulated roles and functions within police command and control to 
produce different network structures. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to create 
network representations that are appropriate to the focus of task, knowledge or social 
factors.  It is proposed that relying solely on one form of network description might 
lead to omission of data that do not comply with the representation.  This means that 
we would expect to represent task factors in the form of a task network, knowledge in 
the form of a knowledge network and social factors in the form of a social network.  
This is in contrast to assuming, for instance, that social or knowledge factors can be 
‘bolted’ onto task models, or that task or knowledge factors can be adequately 
represented by social networks. Such an approach recognises the challenge inherent in 
describing social networks that have been created for the performance of a specific 
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objective.   As Richards (2001) pointed out, in her consideration of a related 
phenomenon, “…despite the empirical prevalence of coordination problems, we have 
failed to achieve a full theoretical account of coordination. The theoretical cul-de-sac 
arises because coordination problems by definition have multiple equilibria, resulting 
in indeterminate predictions.” (p.259).  Her solution was to describe coordination 
networks as a combination of communication (via a network of connected 
individuals) and shared knowledge (through the use of the concept of mental models, 
with elements that several people might use).  Taking the lead from this work, it is 
proposed that covert networks require some sharing of knowledge and that 
communication could represent a minimal means of managing network activity.  For 
example, studies by Banks and Calvert (1972) indicate that it is possible to manage 
sharing of knowledge through exchange of representations (A is like B) rather than 
direct comment (I choose A).  The implication of this, and similar studies, is that a 
focus on communication between agents might skew the analysis inappropriately.  In 
order to illustrate this point, we take as a starting point the  bombing of two pubs in 
Birmingham by the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in 1974.  This case is particularly 
noteworthy not because there was any attempt to use social network analysis but 
because the verdict was over-ruled and discredited some 20 years (?) later.  This case 
has become infamous as the ‘Birmingham Six’. 
 
Using Social Networks to Represent Covert Cells 
The use of ‘cells’ (small units of 3-5 operatives with minimal connection to other 
cells) was used effectively by the IRA during the 1970s (Robertson, 1987; Rosen, 
2004).  It is likely that this form of organisation was used by the Viet Cong, but the 
structure of the IRA has been more readily adopted by other urban terrorist groups.  A 
challenge, therefore, to the network analyst is to define membership and association 
with such cells.  Such an effort is confounded by the apparent lack of direct 
association between cell members prior to operations.  It is also complicated by the 
observation that such cells tend to perform specific functions within the organisation 
as a whole, e.g., one cell might assume responsibility for logistics, another for 
operations, another for communication etc.  This suggests that each cell would be 
closed, insular and protected. These various cells connect together to form a scale-free 
network that has a dynamic membership, non-hierarchical structure and ill-defined 
connections.   
 
A key paper in the SNA of covert structures, in recent years, has been Krebs (2002) 
work on analysing interconnections between people in the cells responsible for 9/11.  
He begins by recognising Sparrow’s (1991) observation that covert (criminal) 
networks will, by definition, by incompletely specified (in terms of available 
intelligence), exhibit fuzzy-boundaries between other networks and across particular 
activities, and by highly dynamic (with membership being subject to change).  Krebs 
(2002) solution to these problems was to explore the connections between people who 
were likely to be involved in the activity. This led to the development of a series of 
social networks as information became available. 
 
The Birmingham Six 
In November 1974, two bombs exploded in Birmingham, killing several hundred 
people, making it one of the worst terrorist acts on the UK mainland during the IRA’s 
campaign.  Police and Security Forces were under intense pressure to bring about 
arrests and, within a few hours of the explosions, had arrested six men who were 
believed to be the perpetrators.  They were arrested, subjected to interrogation and 
forensic analysis and then charged.  After appeal, some 20 (?) years later, all charges 
were quashed and they were released.  The actual bombers have not been arrested. 
 
Reading through accounts of the trial, it is possible to identify links between 
individuals and to define these links in terms of strength of tie.  Figure two shows a 
Social Network Analysis diagram in which strength of tie is defined by the number of 
unique points of association between individuals, i.e., if they were at school together, 
if they worked together, if they drank in the same pub etc.  From this it is possible to 




Figure Two: Social Network Diagram showing people mentioned in Birmingham Six 
trial 
 
What is evident from this diagram is that four individuals stand out visually as key in 
this network.  Applying analysis for Status and Bevalis-Leavitt Centrality allows us to 
further quantify membership of the network.  Table one shows the analysis for 
Status.1   Following the logic that a node is significant if it exceeds the mean score (in 
this case, Mean: 0.64), then 7 people are ‘key’.  These are the Birmingham Six and 
James McDade (whose funeral they were travelling from Birmingham to Northern 
Ireland to attend).  In terms of Centrality, an agent is deemed to be most central if it 
has the lowest score. Ranking these nodes in descending order of centrality suggests 
that the most central node is James McDade, and he is the person who links the other 
agents.  This is because it was his funeral that the other were attending (and he was 
also associated with some of the other people through frequenting the same pub). 
 
Of course, this diagram is based on consideration of evidence presented in Court – but 
an important point to note is that constructing a network on the assumption that 
people are guilty will support the assumption rather than provide an alternative 
perspective.  What is, perhaps, more pertinent to the discussion in this paper is that a 
‘covert’ network will (by definition) be likely to resist scrutiny by network analysis. 
The fact that six people are so prominently connected ought to raise some concern as 
to whether or not these connections are suspicious. Indeed, one of the arguments used 
to campaign against the convictions was that the arrest of these six people on the way 
to the funeral of an IRA member (who had blown himself up some seven days earlier 
while planting a bomb in a Telephone Exchange in Coventry), should either have 
raised some questions – either they would not have gone directly from an IRA 
bombing to an IRA funeral, or this represented some elaborate double-bluff. 
 
Status  Node  Centrality  Node  
1.67  John_Walker  4.76  James_McDade  
1.25  William_Power  5.41  Paddy_Hill  
1.08  Hugh_Callaghan  5.41  Hugh_Callaghan  
1.0  Gerry_Hunter  5.41  Gerry_Hunter  
0.92 Paddy_Hill  5.67 William_Power  
0.75  James_McDade  5.67  Thomas_Watt  
0.75  Dick_McIlkenny  5.95  McDade_family  
0.33  Thomas_Watt  6.26  Michael_Murray  
0.25  Michael_Murray  7.0  John_Walker  
0.08  Michael_Sheehan  7.0  Michael_Sheehan  
0.08  Kenneth_Littlejohn  7.0  Sandra_Hunter  
0.08  McDade_family  8.5  Dick_McIlkenny  
0.08  Sandra_Hunter  119.0  Kenneth_Littlejohn  
Table One: Calculations of Status and Centrality for people mentioned in accounts of 
the Birmingham Six case 
 
 
In their paper, Carley et al. (2003) follow the observation that covert networks are 
cellular and distributed, and propose the need to develop a dynamic network analysis.  
This offers a means of addressing Richards (2001) ‘multiple equilibria’ problem, by 
                                                 
1 All SNA calculations in this paper has been performed using the WESTT software and validated 
using Agna. 
developing a meta-matrix of people, resources and tasks.  In this paper, our approach 
is to explore task models through conventional Human Factors methods, and then to 
consider knowledge through the use of propositional network analysis. 
 
Task Networks 
Much of the focus on media attention relating to terrorist activity has been on the 
outcome of particular activity, or the question of what motivates someone to engage 
in such actions.  Less attention is given to the more prosaic questions of what actions 
are required to perform and support the activity.  Drawing an analogy with traditional 
Human Factors domains, we can begin to develop notions of these actions through 
task models. 
 
Annett et al (2000) argued that team goals must share common performance criteria 
(i.e., the team product) with which the success or failure of the team can be judged 
against.  Team processes normally stress the importance of communication and co-
ordination activities.  Annett at al (2000) propose that it is important that the task 
analysis captures the three principle components of team work, namely the 
communication, co-ordination activities as well as team goals.  The team work 
descriptions are rather more complicated than task work description, because of the 
interdependences and synchronisation of work between, rather than within, individual 
agents.  Gramopadhye & Thaker (1998) illustrate how team tasks can be represented 
by allocation of function, interaction, error analysis, and knowledge requirements.  
Team performance requires an understanding of the team competencies, the 
communication and task requirements, the team environments, and the team 
objectives and mission (Salas, 2005).  Therefore, we can assume that a network exists 
to achieve some goal (even if that goal is not concrete for a given network at the time 
of its formation).  As Baker and Faulkner (1993) point out in their analysis of criminal 
networks, the purpose of the network is to achieve some goal.  To our knowledge, the 
question of how tasks are managed within a covert networks has received less 
attention than the social and organizational structure of such networks.  Jenkins 
(1987) suggested that,  “Six basic tactics have accounted for 95 percent of all terrorist 
incidents: bombing, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings, and 
barricade and hostage incidents. Looking at it another way, terrorists blow up things, 
kill people or seize hostages.” (p.154).  Approaching this argument from a human 
factors point of view, it ought to be possible to develop task models for each basic 
tactic, and for the approaches of different groups to be represented as low-level 
variations in these task models. 
 
With regards to the roles that teams take within systems, Cooke (2005) suggests that 
teams are required to detect and interpret cues, remember, reason, plan, solve 
problems, acquire knowledge and make decisions as an integrated and co-ordinated 
unit. Team-based activity in complex systems comprises two components: teamwork 
and taskwork. Teamwork refers to those instances where actors within a team or 
network co-ordinate their behaviour in order to achieve tasks related to the teams 
goals. Taskwork refers to those tasks that are conducted by team members 
individually or in isolation of one another.  Team-based activity involves multiple 
actors with multiple goals performing both teamwork and taskwork activity. The 
activity is typically complex (hence the requirement for a team) and may be dispersed 
across a number of different geographical locations.  Having developed a high-level 
task model, the next step is to considering how it can be ‘crewed’.  This is similar to 
defining roles for members of a cell, and allocating duties to these roles.  Sullivan and 
Bunker (2005) noted that “Linking network structures to network roles offers better 
insights into how networks form.” (p.185).  In his analysis of transnational criminal 
networks, Williams (2001) suggested six basic roles for such networks: 
 
o Organizers – provide steering mechanisms for network 
o Insulators – protect core from infiltration 
o Communicators – ensure communication flows between nodes 
o Guardians – security enforcers 
o Extenders – recruitment 
o Monitors – report weaknesses 
 
Within the IRA in the 1970s, cells tended to consist of 3-5 people and to be organised 
with an Officer in Charge (who would most likely assume the Organizer and 
Communicator roles), a Quartermaster (whose role was to source and supply guns, 
explosives and other requirements), an Intelligence Officer (whose role was, amongst 
other things, the evaluation of targets), and other Operatives (Mullins, 1987).  The 
Officer in Charge would be appointed because of previous experience, and would 
most likely be the single point of contact between the Cell and other higher authorities 
(who would be responsible for funding, organization, strategy etc.). However, links to 
these higher authorities would be minimal and the Cell would, to a large extent, be 
autonomous.  The Quartermaster would need to manage storage and distribution of 
materials, which would be potentially the most risky operation.  The Operatives will 
be trained and tasked to perform specific actions, which might not require knowledge 
of the overall objective or other people’s actions.  This leads to a clear allocation of 
function within and across Cells, and possible duplication of effort to ensure 
continuity. 
 
According to Steiner (1972), tasks can be divided into five basic types: additive, 
compensatory, disjunctive, conjunctive or discretionary.  These task types differ in the 
degree to which effective performance depends upon the "richness" of information 
transferred between individual group members. McGrath and Hollingshead (1994) 
proposed that they differ in the amount of additional information they require. Simple, 
low ambiguity tasks e.g. additive tasks require no additional information beyond the 
acquisition of facts, and indeed any evaluative or emotional information may be a 
hindrance to effective performance. In contrast complex, high ambiguity tasks, such 
as disjunctive tasks, where there are conflicting interpretations about the situation, do 
require additional information in order to resolve disagreements through the exchange 
of subjective views. In addition some tasks will comprise of a combination of these 
task types. Therefore the effectiveness of the group will be determined by how well 
the interaction of its members fit the requirement of the task. 
 
We propose that it is possible to recruit work from the area of task analysis for team 
performance to gain some insight in this question.  In order to pursue this question, 
we take the position that a network is set up in order to achieve a specific goal and 
that allocating personnel to achieve this goal is analogous to crewing problems that 




 Figure Three: Proposed task model 
 
From figure three, one might ‘crew’ the mission with four primary agents {Officer in 
Charge, Quartermaster, Intelligence, Explosives}, with links to higher Command and 
(possibly) to ‘outside agents’.  This would follow the sort of cell structure adopted by 
the IRA in the 1970s.  Table two shows how one might begin to create such a crewing 
model for the mission.   For each task, we assume that it can be classified as either 
strategic, tactical or operational. there is a possible member of the cell who would be 
likely to take responsibility, and (if necessary) some agents external to the cell who 
would be involved.  This information is sufficient to produce the Sequence Diagram 
in figure four and the social network in figure five. 
 
During his investigations, Mullins (1986) reported an account of the Birmingham 
bombings from someone he identified as X.  Table two also includes a column that 
maps X’s account of events onto the task model.  This leads to the production of the 
social network in figure six. 
 
Task Type ‘Crew’ in Cell External X’s account 
Identify target strategic  Command  
Define type of target strategic  Command  
Strategic importance strategic Officer in Charge   
Publicity impact strategic Officer in Charge   
Prioritise target tactical Officer in Charge   
Consider location tactical Intelligence Officer   
Consider access tactical Intelligence Officer   
Consider publicity tactical Command   
Select target tactical Officer in Charge  any  
Create explosive operational Explosives  x 
Receive training strategic  Outside agent  
Select competent agent tactical Officer in Charge   
Obtain materials operational Quartermaster  ? 
Retrieve detonator operational Operative  a 
Retrieve timing device operational Operative  a 
Receive materials operational Explosives Outside agent x 
Assemble materials operational Explosives  x 
Create safe subassemblies operational Explosives  x 
Deliver device operational Explosives  x 
Plant device operational Operative  a, b, c 
Travel to location operational Operative   
Transport device operational Officer in Charge  oic 
Select appropriate position tactical Operative  ? 
Connect detonator to 
device 
operational Operative  a 
Make final connection operational Officer in Charge  a 
Post lookout operational Intelligence Officer  oic 
Activate device operational Operative  a 
Manage publicity tactical Officer in Charge   
Make telephone call tactical Officer in Charge  x 
Define call sign strategic  Command  
Define recipient strategic  Command  
Pass message tactical Officer in Charge   
Claim responsibility strategic  Command  
 
Table two: Mapping of task model onto task types and roles 
 
Having tentatively assigned roles to tasks, it is a simple matter to relate this to a 
sequence diagram.  We can assume that some tasks will be dependent upon others, 
and this determines the sequence shown in figure four. 
 
 
Figure four: Proposed crew for task model shown in figure three 
 
Figure four represents a fairly large collection of individuals.  This could represent a 
problem for coordinating activity, and could also provide several potential points of 





Figure five: Social Network Derived from Task Model 
 
In crew studies, the primary concerns are to allocate function to appropriately skilled 
individuals so as not to overload them.  This means that workload and skill-level of 
key concerns.  One can assume that similar concerns arise in the ‘crewing’ of covert 
cells. Indeed, “Removal of high cognitive load individuals tends to be more disruptive 
than the removal of individuals high in degree centrality.” (Carley et al., 2003).  One 
reason for this could well be that removal of individuals whose actions lie on the 
critical path of the mission (irrespective of their place in a social network) could lead 
to delay or termination of the mission. As Sullivan and Bunker (2005) note,  “While 
individual hubs are important, and hubs with high capacity…are critical, the workload 
must be distributed across the network to optimize resilience. Multiple hubs, 
reinforced by clusters of nodes with distributed capabilities, can absorb both random 
failure and intentional attack.” (p.195).  This suggests the need to optimise the size of 
the ‘crew’ in terms of skill, workload and resilience.  One might argue that X’s 
account of the Birmingham bombings reflects a cell that had a specific skill (X’s work 
on explosives), together with a division of labour: ‘a’ fetched the detonator and timing 










Figure seven: Social network of X’s account 
 
 
Some of the difference between figures five and seven simply reflect the fact that X’s 
account does not cover all elements in the task model.  A further difference lies in 
allocation of duties. For example, the OiC was supposed to make final preparations of 
the device but, ultimately, this was done by ‘a’.  Comparison of these two network 
diagrams is interesting. Both show a central role of the Officer in Charge (OiC) and 
links from the Explosives (x) agent to other agents.  This implies that ‘?’ in figure 
seven could be the Quartermaster, and that a, b, c are Operatives.  It is tempting to 
also assume that at least one of the Operatives could correspond to X and the other to 
the Quartermaster (which would better align the diagrams, and is possible, given the 
inconsistencies in X’s account). 
 
How do social network analysts deal with knowledge? 
 
There has been a long tradition in the social networks community to assume that 
‘knowledge’ was owned by an individual, and that linking to this individual would 
provide access to this knowledge.  By implication, this would mean that sharing of 
knowledge would require other individuals to link to this specific individual.  In a 
similar vein, contemporary notions transactive memory (Wenger, 1987; Borgatti and 
Cross, 2003) assumes  that knowledge is distributed across agents and that, in order to 
use such knowledge effectively, individuals need to know who knows what.  While 
this looks like a promising line of enquiry for networks that are relatively stable, static 
and well-defined, it becomes particularly problematic for the analysis highly dynamic 
networks, such as covert networks. A review of the social network literature suggests 
that the interaction between individuals (or groups/entities) and knowledge is 
typically represented in three different ways: 
 
1. Social network structure 
The first approach to combining social networks and knowledge is to not represent 
knowledge explicitly but rather to draw conclusions largely from the structure of the 
network. In such an analysis one may, for example, identify clusters of individuals. 
Either on the basis that they are grouped together, or more usually with reference to 
an informal understanding of those individuals’ job description or interests, they may 
be identified as a community of practice (Wenger, 1998). Communities of practice 
have three defining qualities: First, they have a domain; they are about something 
such development of a new product or information technology support. Second, they 
are constructed from relationships between individuals and it possible to note 
boundaries between being within and outside a community. This identification of 
boundaries naturally lends itself to the techniques used in social network analysis; we 
may for example define group membership in terms of either a clustering or in terms 
of a statistical criteria of geodesic distance between nodes or the values/weightings of 
edges connecting nodes (i.e., frequency of communication between nodes or other 
measure of strength of connection).  It might also be possible to, in terms of network 
metrics, identify other roles with relation to a community of practice, for example 
individuals who connect various groups, and may act as gatekeepers or facilitators. 
Third, communities of practice have a body of practice which differentiates them 
from groups who merely have a passive interest in a topic; this might be indicated by 
the shared use of common tools, ideas, documents or other artefacts to pursue goals 
(see Wenger, 2004). Communities of practice are autonomous and may exist across 
organisations or across demarcations made in organisational charts: on this basis they 
should not be confused with teams or functional groups (O’Hara et al., 2002). Notably 
in this network-centric approach, the actual objects of knowledge are not themselves 
closely identified, indeed some authors argue that communities of practice generate 
and organise their own knowledge and that attempting to objectify knowledge would 
be to miss the exchange of tacit or implicit knowledge between actors (Wenger, 
2004). None the less, the transition from identifying a cluster to identifying it as a 
community requires at least the subjective assessment that they have commonalities 
and given that this becomes an inductive process once the cluster is identified, there 
may be instances where researchers search for tenuous confirmatory evidence of 
commonalities rather than contradictory evidence. Clearly there may be cases when 
such groups are falsely identified on the basis of spurious epiphenomenal statistical 
patterns (i.e., statistical type I errors) or otherwise not noticed (i.e., statistical type II 
errors). 
 
2. Knowledge category tracks 
A second approach is to use social networks normally but to categorise individual 
nodes formally in terms of a classes of knowledge they use. This produces a 
visualisation of the network that is reminiscent of the London Underground map 
where different tracks (e.g., the Bakerloo line) represent different classes of group 
membership or knowledge (e.g., “has expertise in demolitions”, “has access to 
security briefings”, “has a degree in a scientific subject”). An alternative but 
equivalent visualisation is to produce separate social networks for each type of 
knowledge as a subset of a larger network. Social network analyses can then be 
carried out to measure and then compare the qualities of each network. Again, 
communities of practice can be identified (a class of knowledge may be restricted to a 
limited part of the network) and gatekeeping roles identified (individuals may be 
connected to multiple tracks). A notable use of this approach has been in the mapping 
of terrorists following 9/11 in terms of which group of hijackers they belonged to or 
which function they undertook (e.g., Krebs, 2002). One drawback of this technique 
for knowledge representation (rather than solely group membership) is that it is 
typically limited to a small number of types of knowledge and fails to capture 
relationships and overlaps between different types of knowledge itself. The decisions 
made by the analyst in grouping various types of expertise or knowledge may have a 
distorting effect upon the ensuing analyses. Further, whilst we might understand 
socially mediated connections between different types of knowledge, the nature of 
that knowledge itself is not explored. 
 
3. Combined social and knowledge networks 
The third kind of approach, which WESTT and its related methodology are a part, is 
to take social networks as above and link them to networks of knowledge. There are 
various approaches to the mathematical construction of such networks; one may 
construct two different networks of knowledge and social actors respectively, and 
then link and compare across the two matrices or else adopt a “flat” structure and put 
both knowledge and actors into the same matrix. In the general case, these two 
approaches should be formally equivalent although it will depend on the exact nature 
of the analyses produced. This approach to combining networks appears to most 
popular where researchers are interested in web-based applications of social network 
theory and knowledge is generated from automated “screenscraping” or textual 
analysis of webpages and then linked back to the individuals who own, are mentioned 
in or perhaps have used those webpages. For example, O’Hara et al. (2003) report 
success in binding social networks to a network that depicts a knowledge ontology 
based on automated analyses of webpages. This allows the generation of analyses 
which suggest, for example, which specific research interests individuals have in 
common. The signal advantage of this approach is that by making a closer-grained 
analysis of knowledge this provides a richer understanding of the nature of 
connections between individuals. For example, if we see a cluster or clique of 
individuals in a social network, there may be a similar clustering in terms of the 
knowledge they utilise, which would present strong evidence of the existence of a 
community of practice. However, if there was not this clustering in the knowledge 
itself we might instead suggest that the clustering is a result of some other factor, for 
example a diktat of the organisation or mere geographical proximity of the actors in 
their workspace. 
 
Propositional Networks and Role 
From the description of activities considered previously, it is possible to identify core 
topics about which people need to discover and share knowledge. We term these 
topics ‘knowledge objects’ and claim that they can be represented, at a system level, 
in a simple network diagram. Relations between knowledge objects are defined in 
terms of propositions, i.e., a <building> <has> <location> (where building and 
location are knowledge objects, and has is the association between them).   
The basic concept is that each knowledge object is used by specific agents. If more 
than one agent makes use of a knowledge object, then it is represented as a striped 
node in the network.  Thus, in figure eight, there are six knowledge objects that are 
used by more than one agent. The essential point to note is that this does mean that 
this does not mean continuous communication between the agents. Rather, it  means 
that some of the knowledge objects have the potential to be ‘shared’. Thus, 
<Location>  refers to both the <target?> and <materials>, and is used by 
Quartermaster, Explosives, Intelligence in different ways..  Likewise, <transport> is 
used by explosive, operative, Officer in Charge.  The implication is that the 
































From the Propositional Network, it is possible to construct another Social Network 
Diagram (figure nine). In this diagram, we assume that agents are linked if they 
‘share’ knowledge.  Thus, knowledge objects with more than one agent associated 
with them imply communication. It is not claimed that the communication need 
always be direct, e.g., the knowledge object ‘Materials’ could imply that two agents 
know the location of the ‘materials’ but could travel there at different times without 
any explicit communication. 
 
 
Figure Nine: Social Network reflecting Propositional Network 
 
Figure nine implies more communications than the other Social Networks, although it 
still places the Officer in Charge in the centre of the network and still suggests strong 
links between Explosives and Quartermaster. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have asked the question can social networks be constructed on the 
basis of task and knowledge networks? We demonstrate that, for the example used in 
the paper, they can. We suggest that the networks exhibit some interesting similarities.  
The implication is that the conventional Human Factors methods can be beneficially 
applied to Social Network Analysis, to capture the question of how tasks are 
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